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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff /Appellee, 
vs. 
DEON LOMAX CLOPTEN, 
Defendant /Appellant. 
Case No. 20060254 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court pursuant to Utah Code Annotated 
§ 77-18a-l(l)(a) and 78-2a-3(2)(j) (2001 as amended). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Whether the trial court erroneously excluded the testimony of an expert 
witness who would have been able to assist the trier of fact understand how imperfect 
human beings are in their perception of, and memory for, eyewitness identification. 
"With respect to a trial court's denial of a party's motion to present expert 
testimony under rule 702, we have held that u[t]he trial court has wide discretion in 
determining the admissibility of expert testimony, and such decisions are reviewed under 
an abuse of discretion standard." State v. Maestas, 2002 UT 123, ^ f 131 (Durrant, 
Associate C.J., dissenting in part and concurring in part); see also State v. Maestas, 1999 
1 
UT 32, 984 P.2d 376 (Maestas I) (defense counsel rendered ineffective assistance by 
failing to take action to educate the jury about the limitations on the reliability of 
eyewitness identifications). 
2. Whether the defendant's trial attorney was ineffective in not investigating 
and uncovering the plain language of a plea agreement which provided a key prosecution 
witness with much incentive to testify falsely against the defendant and to allege that he 
confessed to the shooting. 
"To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, 'a defendant must show (1) that 
counsel's performance was so deficient as to fall below an objective standard of 
reasonableness and (2) that but for counsel's deficient performance there is a reasonable 
probability that the outcome of the trial would have been different.'" Mvers v. State, 2004 
UT3l,1f20,94P.3d2ll . 
In addition, "When an ineffective assistance of counsel claim 'is raised for the 
first time on appeal without a prior evidentiary hearing, it presents a question of law.'" 
State v. Isiah Bo 'Cage Vos, 2007 Ut App 215, [^9 (Utah App 2007) (citations omitted). 
For unpreserved issues, the matter may be reviewed under the doctrines of plain 
error, manifest injustice, or ineffective assistance of counsel. State v. Morgan, 813 P.2d 
1207, 1210-11 (Utah App. 1991); State v. Casey, 2003 UT 55 at^40, 82 P.3d 1106 
("'[Mjanifest injustice' has been defined as being 'synonymous with the "plain error" 
standard.'"); see also Casey, 2003 UT 55 at f^ 41 (The manifest injustice or the plain error 
2 
standai • > ' . -. , 11; the error should have 
been obvious to the trial court; and (iii) the error is harmful, i i .ihsctil \W an u 1 Inn i in a 
reasonable likelihood -tf a more fas orable outcome for the appellant, or phrased 
3. Whr4U ' '. . .N::esting a 
jury instruction on a lesser included offense. The standards of review listed abo\ <•**.. 
second issue also apply here. 
Il Mil l[i S|<,RV A'l ION OF THE ARGUMENT 
For issue one, the issue was ravscn nl <liniii< s motions ami lieaini^s R .""32, 
637, 639, 644. For unpreserved issues two and three, the above standards of review appl) 
to this section. 
RULES. S rATl'mS. AND CONSTITUTIONAL P R O V I S I O N S 
The texts of the following relevant const i hit i -.-•* - 3 
contained in this brief or Addendum A. 
I 
UtahR. Evid. 702 
Utah Code \nn ;^  ~<-]-402 
UtanCode^.iP , 7 lQr 1 / 1 Y^ 
- .. , : ) 
3 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On May 21, 2003, Mr. Clopten was charged by Information with Criminal 
Homicide, a First Degree Felony; Obstructing Justice, a Second Degree Felony; Failure to 
Respond to an Officer's Signal to Stop, a Third Degree Felony; and Purchase, Transfer, 
Possession, or Use of a Firearm by Restricted Person, a Second Degree Felony. R 1-4. 
The first trial in this case commenced on May 10, 2005. However, a mistrial was declared 
the next day, due to a conflict of interest. 
The second trial began on February 15, 2006. R 546. After a five day trial, the jury 
convicted Mr. Clopten of Criminal Homicide and Failure to Stop at the Command of a 
Police Officer. R 609-611; R 660: 64.l The jury found Mr. Clopten not guilty of 
Obstructing Justice. R 660:64. Immediately thereafter, during a bifurcated proceeding, 
the defense stipulated that Mr. Clopten was a restricted person whereupon the Court found 
Mr. Clopten guilty of Possession of a Dangerous Weapon by a Restricted Person. R 
660:66. 
On February 24, 2006, the trial court sentenced Mr. Clopten "to an indeterminate 
term of not less than five years and which may be life in the Utah State Prison" on Count I, 
Criminal Homicide, Murder, a 1st degree felony. R 613. The trial court sentenced Mr. 
Clopten "to an indeterminate term of not to exceed five years in the Utah State Prison" on 
Count III, Failure to Respond to Officer's Signal to Stop, a 3rd degree felony. R 613. The 
trial court also sentenced Mr. Clopten "to an indeterminate term of not less than one year 
R = Record. For some of the record cite designations, a colon is followed by a number which 
is the page number in the corresponding transcript. 
4 
nor m o r e than fifteen < -
 f , . 
Dangerous Weap^r m .1 R^M , iai Person, a ?"° degree felon). Count s -inJ " \* - ^ 
o'-.1. .- « ; . .L .. . m n concurrent!mx w 
Clopten was 'further ordered to pay restitution costs incurred by the victim's family for 
uHiiiLsuliiiy uiitl kill luneral expense^ 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On or about December 1, 2002. 1 on\ Fua i l emaa . was shot and killed at a " B o n e 
Thugs -N-Harn : i - \ " • ^. -•- ^ ^ '.---;, ' •.• ^ v : . > ; .:,.! 
Second Soutn !• salt Lake Cit>. R 645 :31 , 'I h e m - m m r of death is ruv. -n d ispuie . Dur ing 
an execiilnHi l\|"n: sli 10I111;. - . . . n a a was shot at close range in the head R 645*]34. 
The State's theory was that the shooter was Mr. Clopten. The defense thenr 
shooter was Freddie White. 
A disinterested witness, Bruce William A inn KR' was 1^ 1^  mg . 
located across the street from the area where the shooting occurred. When he w a^  retiring 
to be1, he hc-AU) . . 0. euiuu;!;. ,K>Ked out the 
window. He saw four people running away from the victim to a nearby SUV. R 646:304. 
Mr "<"i iiiiKHii: w.m. lied a person in a icd jacket or a red fleece coat enter the SUV on the 
passenger side. R 646:304-305 Freddie White was the passenger. Tv\ o olhn passentiers 
\* e:;- .. die cai , 1 \11dre ChrisU-piiCi \ iainby and Brandon Grissett, but Freddie White was 
the passenger who later confessed to the slin >nliniz. \l u ]i V4lI ' 
2
 Part of the preliminary hearing transcript was read into the record during the trial. Compare R 
i • — .h R 646 (pocket part). Hence, those pages from, the two transcripts are identical. 
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Mr. Aimone's wife, Brenda Aimone, was staying with her husband at the Marriott 
Hotel on the night in question. R 646:311 4-17. In separate testimony, Mrs. Aimone 
independently confirmed that she watched a person in a red jacket or a red hoody enter the 
SUV on the passenger side. R 646:312-313. A suspect, Deon Clopten, did not enter the 
SUV on the passenger side. Rather, he was the driver of the SUV. 
Although the State tried to suggest that the Aimones' identification was incorrect 
due to their hotel location eleven floors above the crime scene, the Aimones did not waver 
in their testimony that the person in a red jacket had entered the passenger side of the 
SUV. R 646:316 ("I could say 99.99 percent sure it was the passenger side. I know he 
didn't get into the driver's side"). Indeed, the Aimones did not try to disingenuously 
expound on their eyewitness testimony by claiming unusual detail or that they saw the 
shooting. Instead, they remained focused on the color of the suspect's clothes which could 
be seen from afar. They both explained that the red hoody clothed suspect got into the 
passenger side of the vehicle. 
The passenger, Freddie White, confessed to shooting Tony Fuailemaa several 
different times to multiple people. Immediately after being bailed out of jail, Freddy 
White confessed to Raylynn Gomez that "he did it and that he felt bad." R 647:430 3. Ms. 
Gomez's testimony came after a very unusual and specific warning by the trial court. 
The Court: All right. Ms. Gomez, if you would come forward, and be careful 
as you get up there on the witness stand, please. 
Ms. Gomez, do you understand what is meant when the clerk 
swore you in and said that, if you lie, you would be subject to the 
pains and penalty of [perjury]? 
[Ms. Gomez]: Yeah 
6 
The Court: 
[Ms. Gomez]: 
The Court: 
All right. Do you understand in proceedings such as this, which is 
a homicide, if you should get caught lying under oath, that it could 
be a Second Degree Felony that the State could charge you with. 
That would be [for] Perjury, a Second Degree Felony, subjecting 
you to the possibility of one to 15 years in the state penitentiary 
and a $10,000 Fine with an 85 percent surcharge. Do you 
understand that? 
Yeah 
Okay. You may proceed. 
[Defense Did you have a conversation with Freddie about the shooting and 
Counsel]: what happened? 
[Ms. Gomez]: Yeah, I did. 
[Defense 
Counsel]: 
[Ms. Gomez]: 
[Defense 
Counsel]: 
Tell me what was said by you and by him. 
He told me that he did it and that he felt bad. And he told me that 
he was going to tell the truth, and he started crying. And he was 
like goin' kind of in detail but not detail. 
Okay. Did he say anything about how it happened? 
[Ms. Gomez]: He said that Brandon was the one that was supposed to shoot him. 
But Brandon got scared so he's the one that pulled the trigger. He 
told me he pulled the trigger. 
R 647:429-30. RayLynn Gomez is Freddie White's cousin. Ms. Gomez is Deon Clopten's 
sister. R 647:428. 
Freddie White admitted to another family member that he shot Tony Fuailemaa. R 
647:413. Freddie confessed to LaChe Clopten. 
[Defense When he said that he did it, did he say who did it? 
Counsel]: 
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[Ms. Clopten]: That Freddie did it. Freddie said that he did it. 
[Defense All right. He admitted to you that he shot the victim that was shot 
Counsel]: down here in Salt Lake? 
[Ms. Clopten]: Yes. 
[Defense What did you say to him about that? 
Counsel]: 
[Ms. Clopten]: I said, "If you did that, then why are you lettin' my brother sit in 
prison for that?" 
[Defense And his response was? 
Counsel]: 
[Ms. Clopten]: "Well, I have kids." 
And I said, "My brother has kids." 
R 647:413. 
Freddie White further confided in Tiffany Norman that he knew "Deon didn't do it 
[shoot the victim]". R 647:421, 423. Again, prior to her testimony, the trial court first 
admonished Ms. Norman with its perjury warning. R 647:419. Undeterred, Ms. Norman 
reiterated Freddie White's statements: 
[Defense Tell me what he told you. 
Counsel]: 
[Ms. Norman]: He did tell me that Deon didn't do it. 
[Defense Uh-huh. 
Counsel]: 
[Ms. Norman]: And he broke down and started crying. And I asked him, I [said] 
- 1 kept asking him, "Do you think Deon did it; do you think Deon 
did it?" 
He says - he looks at me dead in my eye and he says, "I know 
Deon didn't do it." 
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And I [said], "Did you do it?" 
And he just broke down and started crying, rocking back and 
forth, holding his head like that. And he says, "I didn't mean for it 
to happen that way. It wasn't supposed to happen like that." 
R 647:421-22. An officer who had earlier interviewed Tiffany Norman acknowledged that 
her statement to him was along the same lines: "Miss Norman stated Freddie told her that 
Brandon was supposed to be the shooter, but the gun jammed and Freddie then grabbed 
the gun and did the shooting. Freddie stated Deon was in the car as the driver." R 
647:523; accord R 647:486 (a disinterested eyewitness, Adam Church, said the driver of 
the vehicle [who was identified because he had relieved himself in the alley before the 
shooting] was not the shooter). 
On the night of the shooting, Freddie White was wearing red. R 645:75, 84. 
Officer Saul Bailey, who was at the crime scene, said Freddie White wore dark colored 
pants and a red short-sleeved T-shirt. R 646:213. Officer Bailey did not observe a white 
jacket. R 646: 217-19. However, a red sweatshirt was found in the back of the car near 
where Freddie had been sitting. R 646:297. For reasons unknown, the sweatshirt was not 
immediately seized as evidence once the SUV had been stopped by pursuing officers. 
Freddie White exited the stopped car out of the rear passenger seat. R 646:158. 
Freddie was wearing red. R 646:213. Deon Clopten was the driver. He also wore red 
sweat pants and a red sweat shirt. R 646:155-56. 
One of the occupants, Andre Christopher Hamby, claimed that as the SUV fled the 
scene a gun was passed between Deon Clopten and Freddie White. Chris Hamby did not 
appear at trial, but his preliminary hearing testimony was read into the record in support of 
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the allegation that Freddie threw a gun out of the car window. R 633:59. Chris was sitting 
next to Freddie, but did not see him throw out another gun. R 633:59. However, two guns 
were found on the side of the road by a passerby. Before the incident, Chris Hamby drank 
about a case of beer and four mixed alcoholic drinks. R 633:40,42. Notwithstanding the 
State's reliance on Hamby and his contention that Deon tried to get rid of the gun(s), the 
jury found Deon "not guilty" of Obstructing Justice. R 660:64; c/R 646:353 (Robert Land 
similarly claimed that Clopten said they got rid of the guns, but the jury still acquitted him 
on the Obstruction charge). Hamby also said that Clopten had shot the victim. R 633:29. 
Other prosecution witnesses included Shannon Pantoja, Tony Fuailemaa's 
girlfriend, who was at the concert with Tony for his birthday. Before the shooting, Tony 
noticed Deon Clopten at the concert and told Shannon that Deon "had some problems with 
some of the homies out in the prison." R 645:36. Shannon never met Deon before and the 
effect of her bad first impression of Deon on her subsequent identification of him as the 
shooter was not addressed by the defense's proposed eyewitness identification expert, Dr. 
Dodd. 
At various times during the trial proceedings, the court indicated it would allow Dr. 
Dodd's testimony and that it would not allow Dr. Dodd's testimony. R 644:13. The court 
admitted to being "wishy-washy" about its ruling. R 644:15. 
Dr. Dodd would have informed the jury about factors affecting the reliability of 
eyewitness identifications. R 259-64 (Letter to Bevan Corry from Dr. David H. Dodd, 
Associate Professor, Department of Psychology) (attached as Addendum B). 
There were weaknesses with Shannon's testimony, but the facts at trial satisfied the 
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sufficiency of the evidence standard of review.3 Mr. Clopten further acknowledges that in 
accordance with counsel's stipulation, Mr. Clopten expressly admitted that he was a 
restricted person. R 660:66. Facts relating to those charges are not expounded upon in his 
brief. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
During the first trial of this matter, the trial court appropriately allowed an expert 
witness, Dr. David Dodd, to assist the jury in understanding the difficulties and 
weaknesses inherent in eyewitness testimony. Since the first trial resulted in a mistrial, Dr. 
Dodd did not then present such testimony. 
However, prior to the second trial, the trial court improperly abandoned its prior 
ruling and then inexplicably switched back-and-forth in its positions on whether Dr. Dodd 
should be allowed to testify. The court ultimately declined to allow his testimony for 
reasons that either are not supported by the facts in the record nor by existing case law. 
Prior defense counsel was ineffective in not investigating and obtaining proof of a 
federal plea agreement relating to Robert Land, a key prosecution witness who claimed the 
defendant confessed to the shooting. Land had much incentive to lie (i.e. to receive a 
reduced federal sentence) and, other than taking Land's word on what he stood to gain, 
defense counsel offered an inadequate basis for impeaching his testimony. 
Prior defense counsel also was ineffective for not providing an alternative jury 
instruction on manslaughter. Manslaughter is a lesser included offense of criminal 
3
 However, the minimum threshold of evidence for an insufficiency argument is different than 
and distinct from the standard of review for other issues in this brief. 
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homicide and a weighing of the evidence was not a prerequisite to its inclusion. 
Mr. Clopten seeks a new trial. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. THE COURT ERRED IN NOT ALLOWING DR. DODD TO ASSIST 
THE JURY IN UNDERSTANDING IMPORTANT ASPECTS OF EYEWITNESS 
TESTIMONY 
"With respect to a trial court's denial of a party's motion to present expert 
testimony under rule 702, we have held that "[t]he trial court has wide discretion in 
determining the admissibility of expert testimony, and such decisions are reviewed under 
an abuse of discretion standard." State v. Maestas, 2002 UT 123, ^ [ 131 (Durrant, 
Associate C.J., dissenting in part and concurring in part); see also State v. Maestas, 1999 
UT 32, 984 P.2d 376 (Maestas I) (defense counsel rendered ineffective assistance by 
failing to take action to educate the jury about the limitations on the reliability of 
eyewitness identifications). 
The problem with such a standard in Mr. Clopten's case is that the trial court was 
admittedly "wishy-washy" about whether Dr. David Dodd would be allowed to testify at 
trial. R 644:15. During the protracted history of the lower court proceedings, the court 
issued rulings and tentatively musings about admitting and excluding Dr. Dodd's 
testimony. 
On January 20, 2005, the court specifically acknowledged Dr. Dodd as an expert. " 
My understanding is the courts have pretty much - and the State can make whatever 
objection they want - the courts have pretty much accepted Dr. Dodd as an expert with 
regards to eyewitness identification. The question is how far his testimony can go. And, 
12 
of course, you know he can't testify to the ultimate issue." R 637:6. 
While the court's statement could have stood on its own merits, it did ask out loud 
if allowing Dr. Dodd's testimony in the above manner would suffice or if clarifying 
instructions on eyewitness identification should be used. R 637:8. Combining such 
efforts was not addressed. 
In preparation for the first trial, on April 29, 2005, the trial court stated "Well, I 
don't have any problem with [eyewitness identification] studies showing that people faced 
with guns have a tendency to focus on the gun, or whatever it is, and the trauma. That 
would be okay if I let him [Dr. Dodd] testify." R 639:12. Under an abuse of discretion 
standard, such a tentative trial court ruling would be affirmed. Pursuant to the rules of 
evidence, Dr. Dodd's testimony constituted "scientific, technical, or other specialized 
knowledge [used to] assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a 
fact in issue,..." Utah R. Evid. 702. 
However, in an apparent turnabout from its initial statements, on May 3, 2005, the 
court granted the State's Motion to Exclude Dr. Dodd's testimony. The court opined, "Dr. 
Dodd's testimony will not relate to specific facts of this case - has not interviewed 
witnesses. Testimony will cause confusion for the jury and would infringe upon province 
of jury to judge credibility. All of the factors [are] adequately covered in [the] [L]ong 
instructions." R 377, 474. Again, under the abuse of discretion standard, if the court's 
ruling had been an isolated occurrence, it may have been upheld.4 
4
 The trial court may have abused its discretion in failing to take account of facts contrary to its 
ruling. R 377, 474. See infra Point I.A. 
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Then once again, over objection from the State, the trial court "reverse[d] its 
decision" and allowed Dr. Dodd's testimony: 
I think the court - 1 apologize to the State. The court's going to reverse its 
decision. I think that you're right, I think I did say that he could testify. I am going 
to let him testify in very limited circumstances. Again, there will be no specifics in 
regards to this case. There will be [no] drawing any conclusions in regards to this 
case, he will not be able to invade the province of the jury in any way. So I will 
allow limited testimony on the part of Dr. Dodd. All right? And I apologize for the 
inconvenience it causes the State, but you ought to have adequate enough time to 
prepare and you should be prepared for his testimony anyway. So the court will 
reverse its ruling. As per his testimony I'll entertain any objections for specific 
questions that are asked and answers that defense tries to elicit. 
R 640:7-8 (May 9, 2005, proceeding). Under an abuse of discretion standard, the court's 
revised and reversed ruling once more could be affirmed. 
Hence, in the first trial, the lower court allowed Dr. Dodd to testify. R 642:42. Due 
to a conflict of interest on an unrelated relationship, however, the first trial ended in a 
mistrial and Dr. Dodd did not testify. R 643. 
In the second trial, the Court again flip flopped. On or about February 9, 2006, the 
trial court changed its mind yet again although its reasoning was no different from its prior 
rationale. In its ruling excluding Dr. Dodd's testimony, the judge said, "It's the Court's 
decision that case law totally leaves that to the discretion of the Court. And I think the 
eyewitness identification instruction does an adequate job. And I think that Dr. Dodd's 
testimony at this point would only confuse the issue." R 644:12. But see R 377,474 (the 
court's earlier ruling said essentially the same thing). 
The abuse of discretion standard must be grounded on something more than the last 
ruling voiced by the judge. It is truly arbitrary and capricious if this Court, under an abuse 
of discretion standard, could have theoretically upheld every other court order which 
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allowed Dr. Dodd to testify and, under the same standard of review in a different appeal, 
could have also theoretically upheld every other court order which prohibited Dr. Dodd's 
testimony. The law must be certain and consistent. 
Anything less, as reflected by the multiple flip-flop rulings, would improperly allow 
each and every trial court ruling to be upheld. If the court had stood by its rulings 
allowing Dr. Dodd to testify, such a ruling would be affirmed. If the court had changed its 
ruling to prohibit Dr. Dodd from testifying, such a ruling could be affirmed. Such 
contrasting rulings cannot both be correct. The law should not be, "anything the court 
says, goes." Moreover, to admit expert testimony in the first trial but to exclude it in the 
second trial is egregiously inconsistent. 
A. DR. DODD'S TESTIMONY WAS ADMISSIBLE UNDER RULE 702 
The rules of evidence state, "If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge 
will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a 
witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may 
testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise." Utah R. Evid 702. Dr. Dodd's 
testimony falls under the plain language of the rule. He should have been allowed to 
testify. 
His qualifications as an expert were not disputed. R 637:6. His scientific, 
technical, or specialized knowledge on eyewitness identification was succinctly laid out in 
his letter to his attorney, R 259-64 (Addendum B), which in turn was filed with the court 
and the State. 
The defense's theory of the case was misidentification or mistaken identity. An 
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expert such as Dr. Dodd should have been able to assist the trier of fact understand the 
eyewitness identification evidence or to determine a fact in issue (i.e. the (un)reliability of 
eyewitness identification). 
Contrary to the lower court's (inconsistent and varied) claim that Dr. Dodd's 
testimony could have caused confusion, he would have done just the opposite. His 
testimony would have helped the jury to understand how different witnesses, some of 
whom were completely disinterested to the proceeding, could have seen the same incident 
or the same suspects with such diverse perceptions. His testimony would not have invaded 
the jury's province on witness credibility. Rather, his explanation could have simply 
highlighted the fact that credible witnesses still make good faith mistakes during an 
identification process. 
Although not cited in its minute entry excluding Dr. Dodd from testimony, R 
644:12, State v. Butterfield, 27 P.3d 1133 (Utah 2001), deserves mention because in a 
prior case Dr. Dodd's testimony was excluded on the following basis: "it is undisputed that 
Dr. Dodd was not familiar with Butterfield, the victims, or the facts of this case." Id. at 
1144. 
Unlike in Butterfield, however, Dr. Dodd was very familiar with the specific facts 
of Deon Clopten's case. In his filed letter with the court, Dr. Dodd's explicitly noted his 
research into, and familiarity with, the following materials: 
Detective Jim Prior's Interview with Saul Bailey on December 2, 2002; 
Detective Jim Prior & SLCO Sheriff Deputy Saul Bailey Interview with Shannon 
Panatoja on December 2, 2002; 
Detective Jon Richey Interview with Shannon Pantoja on December 4, 2002; 
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Preliminary Hearing transcript (Volume I), dated January 8, 2004; 
Preliminary Hearing transcript (Volume II) dated January 30, 2004; 
Transcript of Lineup Proceedings, dated January 21, 2004; 
Color photocopies of 4 individuals including Mr. Clopten, of the lineup 
participants, of the red clothing, and of the scene of the crime; 
Motion by Defense to Suppress Identification; State's Memorandum in Opposition 
to Motion to Suppress; 
Transcript of Judge's Bench Ruling on Motion to Suppress, dated November 23, 
2004. 
Addendum B. Dr. Dodd's familiarity with the case was on par with an attorney's review 
of the record in preparation for direct or cross-examination. 
Dr. Dodd is a recognized expert witness who has testified before in many trials. 
The Butterfield case did not prevent him in prior cases from testifying in his area of 
expertise. Similarly, the stated basis in Butterfield also would not preclude him in future 
cases from testifying in his area of expertise. The trial court erred, in its flip-flopping 
manner, when it ultimately prevented him from testifying. 
B. A JURY SHOULD BE INFORMED ABOUT SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH 
ON EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION AND THE FREQUENCY WITH 
WHICH HUMANS MAKE VERY HONEST MISTAKES ABOUT WHAT 
THEY THOUGHT THEY OBSERVED (BUT DIDN'T) 
In the oft-cited opinion, State v. Long, 721 P.2d 483, 490 (Utah, 1986), our supreme 
court set forth well established and trusted research on the unreliability of eyewitness 
identification: 
Although research has convincingly demonstrated the weaknesses inherent in 
eyewitness identification, jurors are, for the most part, unaware of these problems. 
People simply do not accurately understand the deleterious effects that certain 
variables can have on the accuracy of the memory processes of an honest 
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eyewitness. See K. Deffenbacher & E. Loftus, Do Jurors Share a Common 
Understanding Concerning Eyewitness Behavior?, 6 Law and Human Behavior 15 
(1982); J. Brigham, R. Bothwell, The Ability of Prospective Jurors to Estimate the 
Accuracy of Eyewitness Identification, 7 Law and Human Behavior 19 (1983). 
Moreover, the common knowledge that people do possess often runs contrary to 
documented research findings. See Loftus, supra, at 171-77. 
State v. Long, 721 P.2d 483, 490 (Utah, 1986). Dr. Dodd would have been able to fill this 
gap and make the jurors aware of these problems. See Addendum B. In furtherance of 
Mr. Clopten's theory of the case, Dr. Dodd's expert testimony would have clarified the 
abstract, black letter law of a jury instruction. 
Notwithstanding the trial court's ruling, it is not superfluous to have allowed Dr. 
Dodd to educate the jury on the pitfalls of eyewitness identification. Case law errs on the 
side of educating the jury than to not do so. See State v. Maestas, 1999 UT 32, 984 P.2d 
376 (Maestas I) (defense counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to take action 
to educate the jury about the limitations on the reliability of eyewitness identifications). 
Research confirms that individuals are simply wrong in their perceptions and their 
preconceived notions about identification. Dr. Dodd's testimony would have been helpful 
in that regard. 
The lower court excluded Dr. Dodd's testimony in part because it felt that the Long 
instruction adequately covered the entire area of research relating to the reliability of 
eyewitness identifications. However, the Long instruction lacks several important aspects 
of eyewitness identification that were recognized and addressed in the opinion. Compare 
State v. Long, 111 P.2d 483 (Utah, 1986) with Addendum C (the Long jury instruction). 
Matters contained in the opinion, but absent from the instruction, include the 
complex "memory process," the process of making logical inferences of what should occur 
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next in order to "perceive" a whole event when only portions of the event have actually 
been witnessed; and the effects of the viewer's individual perception including the 
expectations, personal experiences, biases, and prejudices on their memory. In addition, 
questioning techniques can significantly influence what a witness "remembers" in 
response to how an issue is phrased. State v. Long, 721 P.2d 483,488-490 (Utah, 1986). 
Dr. Dodd would have been integral to assisting the jury understand such defense theories 
of the case. 
C. THE LONG INSTRUCTION WAS INADEQUATE FOR THE 
CIRCUMSTANCES IN THE CASE AT BAR 
Dr. Dodd should have been able to cover what was otherwise missing from the 
Long instruction. See Addendum B. Specifically, Dr. Dodd's testimony would have 
focused on how the stress of an event influences the ability to remember facial features. 
The eyewitness identification instruction did not adequately inform the jury of the science 
of eyewitness identification as it relates to memory under situations of extreme trauma. 
Rather, the instruction merely reminded the jury to consider "whether the capacity of the 
witness was impaired by stress or fright at the time of observation." Black letter law 
without an accompanying explanation is quite difficult to absorb. Addendum C. 
Further, a person's ability to identify when a weapon is used is greatly hindered 
because people tend to focus their attention onto the weapon and away from the 
perpetrator. Similarly, a weapon detracts from a person's ability to remember specific 
facial features. The victim has less time to memorize the perpetrator's face. Id. 
The lower court seemed to recognize as much (at least in one of its initial 
statements). "Well, I don't have any problem with [eyewitness identification] studies 
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showing that people faced with guns have a tendency to focus on the gun, or whatever it 
is, and the trauma. That would be okay if I let him [Dr. Dodd] testify." R 639:12. Mr. 
Clopten takes issue with the court abandoning such an appropriate position. 
Finally, Dr. Dodd would have been able to testify regarding the unreliability of 
cross-racial identification with an emphasis on a Caucasian identifying the face of an 
African-American. Shannon Pantoja was not African-American. Deon Clopten was. The 
jury instruction was too conclusory, providing little insight into the research or reasons 
behind the unreliable identifications. Dr. Dodd was a key witness for the defense who 
should have been allowed to assist the jury in understanding the facts at hand. 
POINT II. TRIAL COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE BECAUSE HE FAILED TO 
OBTAIN DOCUMENTATION TO PROPERLY IMPEACH ROBERT LAND, A 
KEY PROSECUTION WITNESS 
Robert Land was an important witness for the State. R 164 (State of Utah vs. Deon 
Clopten, Plaintiffs "Memorandum in Support of Motion in Limine to Admit Evidence 
Pursuant to Rule 404(b)," filed November 12, 2004: "It is imperative that Robert Land's 
testimony comes in..."). Land alleged that Clopten had confessed to shooting Tony 
Fuailemaa. R 646:352 ("he had domed him. That he had shot him."). 
Mr. Clopten's prior counsel, however, failed to take the appropriate investigative 
steps to properly impeach Mr. Land's testimony. State v. Templin, 805 P.2d 182, 188 
(Utah 1990) (" a decision not to investigate cannot be considered a tactical decision"). 
"To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, 4a defendant must show (1) that counsel's 
performance was so deficient as to fall below an objective standard of reasonableness and 
(2) that but for counsel's deficient performance there is a reasonable probability that the 
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outcome of the trial would have been different.'" Mvers v. State, 2004 UT 31, If 20, 94 
P.3d 211; see also State v. Isiah Bo 'Cage Vos, 2007 Ut App 215, \9 (Utah App 2007) 
(citations omitted) ("When an ineffective assistance of counsel claim 'is raised for the first 
time on appeal without a prior evidentiary hearing, it presents a question of law.'"). 
Prior counsel was unable to fully explore whether federal documents told the true 
story of the sentencing benefits that Mr. Land had received because he did not obtain the 
documents.5 In exchange for his incriminating testimony against Deon Clopten, Robert 
Land tried to discount or minimize his benefits in order to heighten his credibility in front 
of the jury. In a different context, our supreme court has recognized the importance of 
prior documentation or writings for impeaching a witness' confident testimony. 
In Tillman v. State, 128 P.3d 1123, 2005 UT 56, the supreme court noted that the 
defense should have been able to impeach a key prosecution witness (Carla Sagers) with a 
written transcript of her prior inconsistencies. 2005 UT 56, f 51. Notwithstanding Sagers' 
verbal and confident assertions at trial, written documentation told the true story. 
Tillman first observes that the suppressed transcripts establish that Sagers was 
unclear about the sequence of events surrounding Schoenfeld's murder. 
According to Tillman, this uncertainty had all but vanished when Sagers took 
the stand at trial at which time she was able to confidently recall the precise 
order of events. Tillman argues that the suppressed transcripts could have 
been used to show that Sager 's memory dramatically improved in a very short 
time, thereby undermining her credibility. We agree. 
2005 UT 56, H 51 (emphasis added).6 
5
 Current counsel moved for a Rule 23 remand to supplement the record with impeachable 
evidence as to the extent of Robert Land's cooperation with state and federal authorities. The Court 
declined to grant the motion. 
6
 Factual differences exist between the two cases, but shared legal principles remain. Tillman 
involved a partial transcript of interviews with key prosecution witnesses, which were suppressed or not 
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Due to prior counsel's failure to secure the necessary impeachment material against 
Robert Land, the jury was left with only his word to determine how much his testimony 
had benefitted him. The prosecution initially suggested that Robert's testimony against 
Deon was credible because he did not receive any deal from the state of Utah. R 646:341. 
However, the extent of his federal sentencing benefit was not independently 
verified by federal documentation. The federal case had been sealed. Nevertheless, given 
the information that came to light about Mr. Land's federal case, any claimed secrecy 
aspect to it did not really exist. During the federal proceedings, Mr. Land's own attorney 
admitted, "there were several people milling about in the courtroom, as I recall." R 
645:10. Consequently, the communications would not have been "confidential." Utah R. 
Evid. 504(a)(6). 
The presence of third parties during a plea or sentence in a publicly accessible 
courtroom negated the privacy basis for sealing the information. Further, while sealing 
documents precludes information from being forwarded to a prison, it did not also 
necessarily prevent its limited use for impeachment purposes. Prior counsel even 
admitted, "I think I can probably get an order to unseal it" R 645:12; R 645:9-10 (prior 
counsel also ignored other alternatives, including trial court suggestions on the matter). 
Arguments relating to the attorney-client privilege or sealed records are misnomers 
disclosed to the defense before trial. While the Brady violation in Tillman is not present in Mr. Clopten's 
case, prior trial counsel's failure to obtain impeachment material on Robert Land is the functional 
equivalent of not having the necessary documentation for cross examination. If, as in Tillman, the 
defense is unable to attack a key prosecution witness because the State suppressed a transcript which 
would have allowed them to reveal impeachment evidence, the same principle applies here if a key 
prosecution witness was not challenged because prior counsel failed to investigate and produce 
impeachment material on Robert Land. 
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and "red herrings" for the circumstances in this case. "A client has a privilege to refuse to 
disclose and to prevent any other person from disclosing confidential communications 
made for the purpose of facilitating the rendition of professional legal services to the 
client..." Utah R. Evid. 504(b). Mr. Land's plea and sentence in open court, however, 
was not a confidential communication, nor did it pertain to communications between Mr. 
Land and his attorney or the rendition of professional legal services. 
Mr. Land had both motive and incentive to lie in order to reduce his federal 
sentence. In May of 2002, the federal government charged Robert Land with violating the 
RICO Act, a crime which carried a potential term of imprisonment of up to life in prison. 
R 646:357; R 646:360. The better he made the case against Clopten, the greater he 
reduced his own federal sentence. 
During discussions with federal authorities, the interviewer suggested to Land that 
his own situation would be helped if Deon had said what Robert said he said. R 646:362-
363. Mr. Land's attorney, Mary Corporon, further realized the potential benefits of Land's 
testimony in Deon's case when she stated, "This [his testimony against Deon] is what may 
get this below the 15 years. And that's, frankly, what we're looking for [a reduced 
sentence]." R 646:363 5-6. 
The interviewer then emphasized, "But you're going to need to testify. I want to 
make it clear - " R 646:363. Mr. Land interrupted the interviewer and stated "I know, I 
know." R 646:363. The interviewer then continued "that you need to testify, that this is 
important enough that you need to testify." R 646:363. 
Once Robert Land supplied the federal authorities with the information that he 
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thought they wanted, the Government "filed a motion asking that your sentence be 
reduced...." R 646:370. Again, the Government's motion or the sentencing proceedings 
were not uncovered to reflect what truly occurred. Robert Land claimed that his federal 
sentence amounted to eight years, R 646:371, but his verbal and confident assertions could 
not be verified or impeached with the appropriate writings. Tillman v. State, 128 P.3d 
1123, 2005 UT 56. Given Land's importance to the trial, prior counsel should not have 
simply relied on the word of a prison cell mate who stood to gain many years of freedom 
by claiming there was a confession. 
The harm from Robert Land's testimony extended beyond an alleged confession. 
While in prison with Deon Clopten, Robert claimed that Clopten was fighting two other 
guys in prison when Mr. Fuailemaa intervened by hitting Clopten to the ground. R 
646:347-349. Land portrayed the two as enemies. R 646:349, 351. 
Prior counsel was ineffective for not investigating and obtaining the documentation 
necessary for a proper impeachment of Robert Land. Counsel made an attempt to obtain 
Mr. Land's sentencing records with a subpoena duces tecum to Mr. Land's attorney, but it 
was not enough under the circumstances of this case. R 645:9 (the state trial court judge 
explained, "it should have been subpoenaed from the federal court."); R 645:10 (the state 
judge also suggested "Maybe you need to subpoena a federal prosecutor and see if they're 
willing to take the stand[,]" to which counsel responded, "No, no. I think we can get a 
court order for unsealing that document for the limited purposes of using it in this trial, I 
guess."). The prejudice and resulting conviction warrants a new trial for Mr. Clopten. 
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POINT III. TRIAL COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE IN FAILING TO INCLUDE 
A MANSLAUGHTER INSTRUCTION IN THE JURY INSTRUCTIONS 
Trial counsel failed to request a manslaughter instruction as a lesser included 
offense to Criminal Homicide, Murder, a 1st degree felony. "To establish ineffective 
assistance of counsel, 6a defendant must show (1) that counsel's performance was so 
deficient as to fall below an objective standard of reasonableness and (2) that but for 
counsel's deficient performance there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of the 
trial would have been different.'" Mvers v. State, 2004 UT 31, ^ 20, 94 P.3d 211; see also 
State v. Isiah Bo 'Cage Vos, 2007 Ut App 215, ^ [9 (Utah App 2007) (citations omitted) 
("When an ineffective assistance of counsel claim 'is raised for the first time on appeal 
without a prior evidentiary hearing, it presents a question of law.'"). 
In determining whether a lesser included instruction is appropriate under an 
evidence based standard, courts have used a two pronged analysis. A jury instruction on a 
lesser included offense must be given "when the trial court determines that (1) the lesser 
offense is 'included' in the offense charged, and (2) there is evidence to justify acquittal of 
the greater offense and conviction of the lesser offense." State v. Kruger, 2000 UT 60, 
TJ15; accord Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402(3) (a lesser offense is included "when (a) It is 
established by proof of the same or less than all the facts required to establish the 
commission of the offense charged; or (b) It constitutes an attempt, solicitation, 
conspiracy, or form of preparation to commit the offense charged or an offense otherwise 
included therein; or (c) It is specifically designated by statute as a lesser included 
offense."). 
Case law already recognizes the satisfaction of the first prong. "[W]e have 
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determined that manslaughter can be a lesser included offense of depraved indiffernce 
murder[.]" Kruger, 2000 UT 60, Tfl6 (citing State v. Piansiaksone, 954 P.2d 861 (1998)). 
Since the jury instructions in Mr. Clopten's case expressly included the depraved 
indifference murder alternative, R 597, 600, 601, manslaughter was an included offense 
for the case at bar. Id. 
For the second prong, "the court is obligated to instruct on the lesser offense only if 
the evidence offered provides a 'rational basis for a verdict acquitting the defendant of the 
offense charged and convicting him of the included offense.' This standard does not 
require the court to weigh the credibility of the evidence, a function reserved for the trier 
of fact. The court must only decide whether there is a sufficient quantum of evidence 
presented to justify send the question to the jury,..." State v. Baker, 671 P.2d 152, 159 
(Utah 1983) (emphasis added). 
In Mr. Clopten's case, even if he were to concede that the State's evidence was 
adequate in terms of the identification of him as the shooter, the strength of such evidence 
is a non-issue for including an instruction on the lesser offense of manslaughter. "This 
standard does not require the court to weigh the credibility of the evidence,..." Baker, 671 
P.2dat 159. 
As highlighted above, see supra Statement of Facts, Freddie White's repeated 
voluntary confessions to other individuals (Raylynn Gomez, LaChe Clopten, Tiffany 
Norman) constituted more than "a sufficient quantum of evidence" to justify sending the 
question to the jury. The trial court even threatened two of the witnesses with perjury 
should they testify falsely and all three witnesses still independently conveyed Freddie 
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White's remorse, emotion, and regret in being the actual triggerman. Again, weighing the 
evidence is not a necessary prerequisite for a lesser included offense, but the testimony of 
Bruce and Brenda Aimone further buttressed the rational basis for an acquittal on the 
greater charge. 
Trial counsel performed deficiently by not requesting a manslaughter instruction for 
the jury's consideration and counsel's deficient performance prejudiced him. Similarly, 
under the plain error standard, "(i) [a]n error exists; (ii) the error should have been obvious 
to the trial court; and (iii) the error is harmful,..." State v. Casey, 2003 UT 55 at f^ 40, 82 
P.3dll06. 
CONCLUSION 
Defendant/Appellant, Deon Lomax Clopten, respectfully requests that this Court 
reverse his conviction and remand his case for a new trial. 
SUBMITTED this (° day of October, 2007. 
Ronald S. Fujino 
Attorney for Mr. Clopten 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that I have caused to be hand-delivered the original and seven 
copies of the foregoing to the Utah Court of Appeals, 450 South State, 5th Floor, P. O. 
Box 140230, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0230, and two copies to the Utah Attorney 
General's Office, Heber M. Wells Building, 160 East 300 South, 6th Floor, P. O. Box 
140854, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854, this Uf& day of October, 2007. 
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ADDENDUM A 
(Relevant Rules, Statutes, and Constitutional Provisions) 
RULES, STATUTES, AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
Utah R. Evid. 504 Lawyer-Client 
(a) Definitions. As used in this rule: 
(1) A "client" is a person, including a public officer, or corporation, association, or other 
organization or entity, either public or private, who is rendered professional legal 
services by a lawyer, or who consults a lawyer with a view to obtaining professional legal 
services. 
(2) A "lawyer" is a person authorized, or reasonably believed by the client to be 
authorized, to practice law in any state or nation. 
(3) A "representative of the lawyer" is one employed to assist the lawyer in a rendition of 
professional legal services. 
(4) A "representative of the client" is one having authority to obtain professional legal 
services, or to act on advice rendered pursuant thereto, on behalf of the client, or one 
specifically authorized to communicate with the lawyer concerning a legal matter. 
(5) A "communication" includes advice given by the lawyer in the course of representing 
the client and includes disclosures of the client and the client's representatives to the 
lawyer or the lawyer's representative incidental to the professional relationship. 
(6) A communication is "confidential" if not intended to be disclosed to third persons 
other than those to whom disclosure is in furtherance of the rendition of professional 
legal services to the client or those reasonably necessary for the transmission of the 
communication. 
(b) General rule of privilege. A client has a privilege to refuse to disclose and to prevent any 
other person from disclosing confidential communications made for the purpose of facilitating 
the rendition of professional legal services to the client between the client and the client's 
representatives, lawyers, lawyer's representatives, and lawyers representing others in matters of 
common interest, and among the client's representatives, lawyers, lawyer's representatives, and 
lawyers representing others in matters of common interest, in any combination. 
(c) Who may claim the privilege. The privilege may be claimed by the client, the client's 
guardian or conservator, the personal representative of a deceased client, or the successor, 
trustee, or similar representative of a corporation, association, or other organization, whether or 
not in existence. The person who was the lawyer at the time of the communication is presumed 
to have authority to claim the privilege on behalf of the client. 
Utah R. Evid. 504 Lawyer-Client (Continued) 
(d) Exceptions. No privilege exists under this rule: 
(1) Furtherance of crime or fraud. If the services of the lawyer were sought or obtained to 
enable or aid anyone to commit or plan to commit what the client knew or reasonably 
should have known to be a crime or fraud; or 
(2) Claimants through same deceased client. As to a communication relevant to an issue 
between parties who claim through the same deceased client, regardless of whether the 
claims are by testate or intestate succession or by inter vivos transaction; or 
(3) Breach of duty by lawyer or client. As to a communication relevant to an issue of 
breach of duty by the lawyer to the client or by the client to the lawyer; or 
(4) Document attested by lawyer. As to a communication relevant to an issue concerning 
a document to which the lawyer is an attesting witness; or 
(5) Joint clients. As to a communication relevant to a matter of common interest between 
two or more clients if the communication was made by any of them to a lawyer retained 
or consulted in common, when offered in an action between any of the clients. 
Utah R. Evid. 702 Testimony by Experts 
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand 
the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, 
experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402 Separate Offenses Arising Out of Single Criminal 
Episode - Included Offenses 
(1) A defendant may be prosecuted in a single criminal action for all separate offenses 
arising out of a single criminal episode; however, when the same act of a defendant under 
a single criminal episode shall establish offenses which may be punished in different 
ways under different provisions of this code, the act shall be punishable under only one 
such provision; an acquittal or conviction and sentence under any such provision bars a 
prosecution under any other such provision. 
(2) Whenever conduct may establish separate offenses under a single criminal episode, 
unless the court otherwise orders to promote justice, a defendant shall not be subject to 
separate trials for multiple offenses when: 
(a) The offenses are within the jurisdiction of a single court; and 
(b) The offenses are known to the prosecuting attorney at the time the defendant is 
arraigned on the first information or indictment. 
(3) A defendant may be convicted of an offense included in the offense charged but may 
not be convicted of both the offense charged and the included offense. An offense is so 
included when: 
(a) It is established by proof of the same or less than all the facts required to 
establish the commission of the offense charged; or 
(b) It constitutes an attempt, solicitation, conspiracy, or form of preparation to 
commit the offense charged or an offense otherwise included therein; or 
(c) It is specifically designated by a statute as a lesser included offense. 
(4) The court shall not be obligated to charge the jury with respect to an included offense 
unless there is a rational basis for a verdict acquitting the defendant of the offense 
charged and convicting him of the included offense. 
(5) If the district court on motion after verdict or judgment, or an appellate court on 
appeal or certiorari, shall determine that there is insufficient evidence to support a 
conviction for the offense charged but that there is sufficient evidence to support a 
conviction for an included offense and the trier of fact necessarily found every fact 
required for conviction of that included offense, the verdict or judgment of conviction 
may be set aside or reversed and a judgment of conviction entered for the included 
offense, without necessity of a new trial, if such relief is sought by the defendant. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-18a-l(l)(a) Appeals - When Proper 
(1) A defendant may, as a matter of right, appeal from: 
(a) a final judgment of conviction, whether by verdict or plea; 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j) Court of Appeals Jurisdiction 
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of interlocutory 
appeals, over: 
(j) cases transferred to the Court of Appeals from the Supreme Court. 
ADDENDUM B 
(Letter to Bevan Corry from Dr. David H. Dodd, Associate Professor, 
Department of Psychology, and his Curriculum Vitae) 
Mr C BevanCorry 
Attorney at Law 
Salt Lake Legal Defenders 
424 East 500 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Re; State of Utah v$. Deon Lomax Clopten 
Case Number 031903432 
Dear Mr. Corry 
What follows is my expert opinion on the Deon Clopton case, formed on the basis 
of my knowledge of the research on eyewitness perception & memory. Information on 
the particulars of this case is formed entirely by the following materials: 
Detective Jim Prior Interview With Saul Bailey on December 2, 2002; 
Detective Jim Prior & SLCO Sheriff Deputy Saul Bailey Interview With Shannon 
Panatoja on December 2, 2002; 
Detective Jon Richey Interview With Shannon Pantoaja on December 45 2002; 
Preliminary Hearing transcript (Volume I), dated January 8, 2004; 
Preliminary Hearing transcript (Volume II) dated January 30,2004, 
Transcript of Lineup Proceedings dated January 2 L 2004; C 
Color photocopies of 4 individuals including Mr. Clopten, of the lineup 
participants, of the red clothing, and of the scene of the crime. 
Motion by Defense to Suppress Identification...; State's Memorandum in 
Opposition to Motion to Suppress; transcript of Judge's Bench Ruling on Motion to 
Suppress, dated November 23, 2004. 
To date, I have testified in more than 20 trials in Utah and Colorado on 
eyewitness issues; my CV was previously provided to you. My testimony would focus 
very specifically on the factors in this case that are relevant to the facts of this case in 
relation to eyewitness issues, particularly those relevant to the identification process. The 
existing research on eyewitness perception and memory has convincingly established that 
accurate identification is a process that involves a number of factors that unfold from the 
time of the initial observation to the subsequent identifications, including identification 
and testimony at trial; some of these factors are relevant to this case and will be 
discussed. 
The research clearly shows that the process of identification often involves factors 
that are not well understood by lay people, that is, that take place differently than 
common sense tells us.1 Some of these factors arc indicated with the discussion of 
factors in what follows. Thus, as described in Loftus & Doyle,2 among the 
^effenbacher & Loftus (1982), Do jurors share a common understanding 
concerning eyewitness behavior? Law and human behavior. 6. 15. 
2Loftus? E- F & Doyle, J. M. (1997). Eyewitness testimony: Civil and Criminal. 
Charlottesville, Va.: Lexis Law Publishing 
misconceptions of lay people is that witnesses remember the details of violent events (or 
those where violence is threatened) better than those of nonviolent ones. Indeed, most 
people remember less well under violence (or threat). Further, while it is clear, consistent 
with common sense, that attention and time to observe are relevant lo a witness's 
opportunity to acquire information, research shows that what a typical lay person might 
judge as an apparently reasonable attention and adequate time to observe are not 
necessarily sufficient to form an adequate memory, particularly for a person's face on 
which subsequent identification must occur. 
Eyewitness testimony is dependent upon human perception & memory; it is 
therefore potentially unreliable, though it can, of course, be very reliable. There are now 
hundreds of research reports and dozens of published books detailing the factors that are 
influential in determining the degree of reliability or unreliability. The particular issue of 
face identification is well studied. The identification of someone well known to a witness 
is extremely fast and accurate, but the identification of someone only seen on one brief 
occasion may be much less reliable. 
Memory experts, including eyewitness specialists, typically divide the process of 
memory into three broad stages: acquisition, retention, and retrieval.3 Acquisition is 
the stage in which the relevant information is encoded through the senses (sight and 
hearing). Retention involve the maintenance of the memory over time, a process 
influenced by the simple passage of time (forgetting) and by related events that may alter 
the original memory. Retrieval is calling up those memories, including the report of 
what is remember and the recognition of whether this is the same person (face) seen 
before. 
Acquisition. 
Acquisition is the most critical and depends heavily upon many conditions, 
especially the opportunity to acquire the necessary information (including distance from 
the perpetrator and lighting), time duration, attentional processes, emotional state, etc. 
Reviewing the specifics of this case leads to several relevant factors: 
Duration of Time and Attention to Person's Face, Based on the interviews 
held shortly after the crime, the witness Ms, Paxrtqja reportedly had one opportunity to 
see Mr. Clopton prior to the person she saw at the time of the crime. As she entered the 
club, Mr, Clopton was pointed out; she reports, though, that "I didn't really look at him 
when I entered the club." This does not appear to provide any information for 
identification. At the time of the crime, there was also a very short period of time to see 
who the person was. Clear-cut identification of a perpetrator is typically a matter of 
recognizing a face; in this case, the ability to attend to the face may have been quite 
limited. Witnesses can quickly pick up certain particulars: this was a male of a certain 
size, wearing particular clothing, engaged in particular activities such as holding a 
3cf. Loftus, E. F. & Doyle, J. M. (1997). Eyewitness Testimony: Civil and 
Criminal. (Third Edition). Charlottesville, VA: Lexis Law Publishing. 
weapon. The two occasions mentioned above do not provide much lime and/or attention 
for subsequent recognition of the face. 
Weapon, The presence of a weapon interferes with the acquisition of information 
in two ways: First a traumatic event involving serious threat of harm to a witness will 
disrupt normal mental processes, including the encoding of information about the events 
and people involved (see discussion in Loftus & Doyle, op cit.) These witnesses indicate 
that there were weapons that were waved and point at them. In general, higher levels of 
stress/fear tend to interefere with mental functioning and have been shown to result in a 
narrowing of attention, a focus on limited portions of the available information, 
especially on a weapon. There is a consistent characterization of Ms. Panloja as 
hysterical, hyperventilating; she was handcuffed by officers at the scene of the crime in 
order to control her due to the intensity of her emotional reaction. 
Second, the presence of a weapon typically results in what is called Cvweapon 
focus," that is, the witness looks at5 and concentrates, on the weapon and is thus not able 
to effectively remember other aspects of what happened and who was involved. Thus the 
weapons being displayed by the perpetrator would interfere with the ability of the witness 
to effectively acquire information about the face of the perpetrator. 
Cross-racial identification. Cross-racial identification is less accurate than same 
race identification, A number of research studies have shown that an identification 
involving a person of another race is less accurate than the identification of a person of 
one's own race. This is especially well established with the situation of white witnesses 
identifying the faces of blacks. 
What is acquired. The research also clearly indicates that certain aspects of 
situations are readily acquired, while clear-cut identification of a face is much more 
difficult. For example, Yuille & Cutshall4 found that witnesses to a real crime were 
much more accurate in their reports of events that occurred than they were at identifying 
the perpetrator, at which they were relatively poor. It is also clearly established the 
certain features of the person are more accurately acquired, e.g., height and body build 
(roughly), type of clothing (e.g., jeans or slacks, type of shirt, hat), features of the face 
(round vs. long), hair (length), approximate age, facial hair. In addition, unusual feature 
of the face (scars, large cars, unusual teeth) or body (tattoos) are also quickly acquired if 
available to view. Yet the information needed to identify a face is much more complex 
and thus difficult to acquire than that needed to remember events & broad features of the 
perpetrator. 
Finally, it should be noted that the acquisition stage is fundamental to any 
subsequent memory. Without adequate acquisition, there is no way that subsequent 
memory can be considered reliable. Indeed, research shows that weak acquisition is 
4Yuille, J. C. & Cutshall, J. (1988). Analysis of the statements of victims, 
witnesses, and suspects. In J, C. Yuille (Ed.), Credibility assessment. (Pp. 175-191) 
Norwell, MA: Kluwer Academic. 
associated with susceptibility to suggestion and with an increased likelihood of false 
confidence in a witness's later retrieval. 
Retention 
The retention stage involves two primary factors, the passage of time and the 
presentation of other information which has the potential to alter the original memory. In 
most cases including this one, retention intervals are often followed by a retrieval which 
is followed by another retention interval followed by another retrieval, etc. 
Alteration through suggestion. The intervention of additional information may 
alter the original memory, especially if that memory is weak. There is now a very large 
body of research5 showing that suggestion can result in changes in "memory," Any time 
a witness sees faces, including pictures or video, there is the potential for suggestion. A 
showup is particularly suggestive since the witness is viewing one person rather than 
choosing from among alternatives. In this case, Mr. Clopton was presented to the witness 
first and was the only one of the four presented in red clothing. 
Retrieval 
The ''final" stage of eyewitness memory is influenced by all of the previous 
factors and by several that relate to the nature of the retrieval process and its 
consequences-
Absence of the perpetrator from the choice set. If the target is absent from a 
photospread or lineup, there is nonetheless a strong chance that the witness will select 
someone. Of course, in a case such as this, there is no definitive way to know whether 
the perpetrator is the defendant. But consider several controlled experiments summarized 
in the review by Shapiro & Penrod (op cit). The average rate of "false alarms" was 25 
% with the target present and 52% with the target absent (a blank lineup); thus, across the 
12 studies of this effect, more than half of the witnesses selected someone from a set of 
choices (photospread) that did not contain the correct face. In one of the most realistic of 
these studies, the rate of falsely picking someone out of a blank lineup rose to nearly 
75%, an effect the study authors attributed to the witness's desire that the perpetrator be 
brought to justice and the belief that the perpetrator was in the photospread. 
Composition of the lineup. The composition of the lineup is fundamental in 
several ways. First, it should be fair in that it matches the description of the suspect 
provided by witnesses. In the available materials, there is no description of the 
perpetrator other than that he was wearing red clothing, but presumably a normal witness 
statement would have provided information about height, weight, etc.. Thus it is unclear 
whether this lineup involves unfairly chosen alternatives. 
Cf. Loftus & Doyle, op cit., chapters 3 & 4. 
Feedback following identification. Finally, several recent studies by Wells & 
his collaborators* all demonstrate that confirming feedback (an indication that the witness 
has selected the suspect) is a powerful basis for sticking with the wrong choice, of 
increasing the witness* s confidence, and of increasing the witness's report of their view 
of the perpetrator, etc. In these studies, feedback indicating that the witness has selected 
the suspect will increase the witness's confidence in later selections even though the 
witness's selection is wrong. Thus any confirmation that a witness has made the correct 
selection at the presentation of the photospread is likely to have exactly this effect, 
including the incorporation of the face in the selected photograph as that of the 
perpetrator. 
Procedural recommendations from NIJ. The analysis of criminal cases in 
which eyewitnesses are definitively proved wrong (described below) is certainly a factor 
in recent recommendations published by the National Institute of Justice7 that focuses 
heavily on the kinds of procedures followed in presenting photospreads and lineups. The 
issues discussed above figure prominently in these recommendations. For example, the 
lineup should be fairly constructed, the witness should be told convincingly that the real 
perpetrator may not be in the pictures/lineup presented. 
Witness Errors, 
In relation to all of the above, it is valuable to note the dangers (and incidence) of 
mistakes in eyewitness identification in various circumstances. A paper by several 
experts in the field8 provides an analysis of 40 cases in which people previously 
convicted of felonies were exonerated based on subsequent DNA evidence. These were 
major crimes in which long sentences were common and most defendants had already 
served several years. The most common thread to the conviction was that eyewitness 
evidence was the sole or primary evidence in 90% of the cases. 
In conclusion, it seems to be the case that the identification by Ms, Pantoja at the 
showupis based on the fact that the perpetrator was dressed in red and that the subsequent 
identifications might be based on previous identifications rather than a memory for a 
person encoded at the time of the crime. 
6Cf. Wells, G. L. & Bradfield, A. L, (1998) "Good, you identified the suspect": 
Feedback to eyewitnesses distorts their reports of the witnessing experience. Journal of 
Applied Psychology. 83, 360-376. 
7National Institute of Justice, Eyewitness evidence: A guide for law enforcement, 
October 1999 
8Well, Small, Penrod, Malpass, Fulero, & Brimacombe (1998). Law and human 
behavior. 
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ADDENDUM C 
(Jury Instruction on Eyewitness Identification) 
INSTRUCTION NO. Jd f\ 
An important question in this case is the identification of the defendant as the person who 
committed the crime. The prosecution has the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt, not 
only that the crime was committed, but also that the defendant was the person who committed 
the crime. If, after considering the evidence you have heard from both sides, you are not 
convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is the person who committed the crime, 
you must find the defendant not guilty. 
The identification testimony that you have heard was an expression of belief or 
impression by the witness. To find the defendant not guilty, you need not believe that the 
identification witness was not insincere, but merely that the witness was mistaken in his or her 
belief or impression. 
Many factors affect the accuracy of identification. In considering whether the 
prosecution has proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is the person who 
committed the crime, you should consider the following: 
1. Did the witness have an adequate opportunity to observe the criminal actor? In 
answering this question, you should consider: 
(a) the length of time the witness observed the actor; 
(b) the distance between the witness and the actor; 
(c) the light or lack of light at the place and time of observation 
(d) the presence or absence of distracting noises or activity during the 
observation; 
(e) any other circumstance affecting the opportunity of the witness to observe 
the person committing the crime. 
(f) the extent to which the actor's features were visible and undisguised. 
3a 
2. Did the witness have the capacity to observe the person committing the crime? In 
answering this question, you should consider whether the capacity of the witness was impaired 
by: 
(a) stress or fright at the time of observation; 
(b) personal motivations, biases or prejudices; 
(c) fatigue or injury. 
(d) uncorrected visual defects. 
3. Whether the witness is of a different race than the criminal actor. Identification 
by a person of a different race may be less reliable than identification by a person of the same 
race. 
4. Was the identification of the defendant by the witness completely the product of 
the witness' own memory? In answering this question, you should consider: 
(a) the length of time that passed between the original observation of the 
witness and the identification of the defendant by the witness; 
(b) the mental capacity and state of mind of the witness at the time of the 
identification: 
(c) the exposure of the witness to opinions, to photographs, or to any other 
information or influence that may have affected the independence of the 
identification of the defendant by the witness; 
(d) any instance when the witness failed to identify the defendant; 
(e) any instances when the witness gave a description of the actor that is 
inconsistent with the defendant's appearance; 
(f) the circumstances under which the defendant was presented to the witness for 
identification. 
3 ^ 
You may take into account that an identification made by picking the defendant from a 
group of similar individuals is generally more reliable that an identification made from the 
defendant being presented alone to the witness. 
You may also take into account that identifications made from seeing the person are 
generally more reliable that identifications made from a photograph. 
If, after considering the evidence you have heard from the prosecution and from the 
defense, and after evaluating the eyewitness testimony in light of the considerations listed above, 
you are convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is the person who committed the 
crane charged, and you find all of the other elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt, 
you must find the defendant guilty of the crime charged. 
If, on the other hand, you are not convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant 
was the person who committed the crime charged you must find the defendant not guilty of the 
crime charged. 
